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Introduction
This article explores the reconfiguration of state-church relations, focusing on the management of Islam in post-Communist Albania. Considered a European 'anomaly' since its very creation, the country has persistently struggled to balance an odd configuration -an Islamic majority, a pluralist society 1 and an often-fragile statehood. 2 Indeed, searching for appropriate solutions that reconcile a pluralist society, a unitary nation and European statehood has represented a permanent challenge for the Albanian polity in the past, just as in the present. The postCommunist solutions for the management of this frail plurality are commonly framed within a local tradition of laïcité, which adapts the French model of strict separation between state and religion to country's specific goals and compromises. 3 This local-specific adaptation, moreover, is seen as a fundamental choice of European modernity, which conjoins the past and the present.
As former President Bamir Topi explains, 'Laïcité is a phenomenon marking the passage to
[European] modernity and Albania was founded as such. The state will keep up with this outstanding tradition [] because laïcité ensures both religious freedoms and co-existence of plural interests in a democratic society'. 4 The term laik state and/or tradition, however, is often taken at face value in terms of its resemblance to the French model, the resolute choice for modernity, and the obstinate continuity across different regimes and moments of transition. Our analysis explores the continuities and changes that mark the Albanian brand of laïcité, with a focus on specific arrangements to manage the Islamic majority after the collapse of Communism. Although the analysis necessarily delves into the broader redefinition of the state's relations with all the religious communities, the main unit of analysis is the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC). 5 The underlying questions of the instead that the relations between particular political regimes and religious traditions are locallydependent constructs. 7 Hence, institutional choices and practices of secularism can only be meaningfully investigated in individual cases and at specific moments in time.
Historical Templates for Creating a Unitary and European Nation-State
What Albanians often refer to as local tradition is a historical set of institutional and ideological solutions negotiated during the creation of the post-Ottoman independent nation-state, 1913-
1939. This historical pool of choices reflects decisions taken under the specific conditions that marked the foundation of the Albanian state -a tiny Islamic-majority and multi-denominational polity, largely considered a European anomaly at the time. That Albanians were among the last people of the empire to mature into a national movement and achieve independence; were surrounded by Orthodox-majority entities claiming their territories; and were internally scattered along competing regional and religious loyalties did not help convince Europeans otherwise. To most outsiders, the distinction between an Albanian Muslim and a Turk was at best blurred, while the existence of a multi-religious nation seemed a rather vague and certainly not familiar concept. 8 The London and Paris peace conferences, which aimed to chart the new political borders of former Ottoman territories in 1913 and 1919 respectively, risked identifying Albanian Muslims with the Ottoman Empire, or even worse, Asiatic Turks. The already independent Balkan states, meanwhile, kept drawing and redrawing plans to share the remainder of the Ottoman territories.
Possible partition of these territories amongst European Christian allies in the region and/or outright deportation of the contested Muslim population were a permanent threat for the Muslim
Albanians. The internal religious divisions among Bektashi, Sunni, Christian Orthodox and
Christian Catholic -each with their own preferences, doctrinal teachings and communal allegiances -did not bode well for internal cohesion either. 9 The Albanian national movement thus faced two mounting tasks: firstly, to convince European powers of the existence of a unitary nation worth having its own 'European state'; and secondly, to actually unify scattered communities towards a common national imaginary. These challenges hung over every major decision that shaped local solutions for planning and engineering the aspiring nation-state.
Intellectual Projections
The canonical writings of the Albanian National Renaissance Ideologues (Alb. 11 As a prominent representative of the renaissance movement bluntly put it, to the 'real' Albanian 'his brothers are his co-nationals, not his co-religionists'. 12 Regarding the provenance and destiny of the Albanian Muslims, renaissance activists mobilized to gather 'scientific' proof that they were 'white Europeans', who hailed from 'an ancient European Pelasgian-Illyrian race' and not the feared 'Asiatic Turks'. 13 In this line of argument, Albanians were further distinguished from Turks by depicting the latter as 'brutal', 'despotic', 'uncivilized', 'barbaric' and 'backward', all features associated with the dark 'Orient'. 14 Europe, instead, was depicted as the Albanians' natural home, which represented the 'true faith' and 'progress' that Albanians had always fought for.
The suggested pillars of areligiosity, national unity, and European provenance ultimately framed an increasingly standard narrative of Albanians' otherwise cluttered historical experiences and common identity. 15 In addition, the renaissance-era intellectuals proposed concrete institutional solutions to formalize the prescribed narrative of the nation, discipline the uncomfortable Muslim majority and handle religious divisions. Specifically, they advocated the restructuring of divisive religious communities into 'Albanianized' autocephalous national churches. These were to be tutored by a laic state charged with the preservation of the whole nation and its European 'destiny'. 16 The aim was to ensure that religious communities would indeed adhere to the prescribed imaginary of a national 'we-ness'.
The Political Pursuit of Albanianism
Intellectual templates for construing an independent European nation-state gained ground during the eventful consolidation of Albanian statehood. The relationship between the emerging state authorities and religious constituencies closely followed the suggested Albanianist templatecultivation of a supra-religious national consciousness under the ultimate guidance of the state.
Initial reforms were conducted under the tutelage of the European powers, which, doubtful of the Albanians' credentials, nominated a German Protestant prince, Wilhelm von Wied, to prepare the country for independent statehood. The first Statute of Albania, adopted in April 1914 while the country was still under Wied's rule, represented a gradual step to separate the state from religion, and the Ottoman legacy more generally. The statute made sure to differentiate between political and religious authority, and placed religious communities under state control. 17 Religious communities, were still allowed some rudimentary political influence, 18 but within a system of separation between the state and church. In order to ensure a gradual transformation, the creation of 'Albanianized' autocephalous communities was postponed to a later period. 19 These initial reforms, however, lasted for only a few months in 1914, and could not achieve much on the ground as the country became a battlefield for competing European armies soon after the start of WWI.
The organization of the 1920 Congress of Lushnja consolidated the power of central state authorities and paved the way for new local impulses towards modern and unitary state building. 20 Still, the emerging authorities faced the 'sublime' task of carving 'a nation and a state out of a gathering of tribes'. 21 The 1922 Constitution first established the main contours of the model of secularism, tailored to country's troublesome religious plurality: the state had no official religion; all religions were free; but they were excluded from any role in the system of legal jurisdiction or politics. 'Do not forget that while fulfilling the holy duty… the fatherland must be above everything.' 26 Intellectuals in general gave their backing to the state's top-down modernist approach, and argued that Muslims had no other choice but to reform according to 'principles of present European life'. 27 The central Sunni Organization followed suit, and adopted the template of Albanianism, including its twist towards European modernity and civilizational progress. In line with state-demanded reforms, the Sunnis' 1929 congress, which was de facto organized by the state, adopted highly controversial reforms, including the use of Albanian as the official language for sermons, the unification of all local madrassas into a single institution, and the closure of many 'superfluous' mosques. 28 The AMC's reshuffled statutes required its head 'to be faithful to the King, to the fatherland and to respect the Constitution with national consciousness". 29 The new chair of AMC, moreover, was selected from the rounds of the country's reformist layers. The 1929 Civil Code abolished also remaining competences of the Islamic courts by stripping the Muslim hierarchy of any forms of political and legal authority. 30 When the country was occupied by the Fascist Italy in 1939, the nationalized Sunni Organization submitted rather easily to the new authorities. Official publications adopted a benevolent stance towards Fascism and denounced anti-Fascist elements as enemies of Islam. 31 The Sunni hierarchy followed a similar strategy vis-à-vis Nazi occupation. Large-scale reforms to nationalize, modernize and co-opt Muslims into the state's political vision were so powerful that the incumbent foreign authorities had no serious difficulties in subduing the Muslims establishment to their own political agenda.
Atheist Policies and Eradication of Religion
The subsequent Communist regime, which held power from 1944 to 1990, took on board the main renaissance ideals of national unity and areligiosity, but it recoded them to assault and in fact eradicate the role of religion as a political, social and moral institution. Religion, considered as a tool of 'foreign aggression' but also an obstacle to the education of the rational socialist man, became subject of forceful atheist policies. Regime's repression of religion evolved in progressive stages, each harsher than the previous one.
The initial crackdowns consisted in curtailing religious organizations' financial and organizational autonomy via the land reform and/or a ban on charity services. More intrusive controls on religious education and heavy censorship of all forms of religious communicationpublications, literature and weekly sermons -followed after Communists' consolidation of power. 32 Towards the 1950s, the regime moved to arrest, indict and sentence all 'reactionary'
clerics. The main religious establishment was replaced with party cronies. A 1949 decree obliged the clergy to declare loyalty to the Communist Party and to the People's Republic of Albania. 33 Academic institutions and state intelligentsias, generously funded by the regime, took an active role in depicting a 'historical' narrative of the clergy as perennial enemies of the nation, foreign agents, and impediments to country's general social and economic progress.
A 'complete emancipation from religious beliefs', indeed the most deadly assault on religious organizations followed in the 1960s. This phase of anti-religious policies, which was modelled on Mao's Cultural Revolution, ended with the abolition of the right of religious practice and the repeal of all related regulations and laws. 34 All remaining religious edifices were closed, demolished or transformed for other uses, including as public toilets or sport halls. Clerics were forced to publically denounce their faith, and those who refused were executed or sent to be re- 36 The vacuum of institutional regulations and the legacy of destruction, however, were much more difficult to undo.
Revising the Relationship between State and Religion

The Institutional Vacuum and Booming Islamic Activities
For most of the 1990s, Albania had no institutional arrangements to regulate the state's relation with the revived religious communities. After decades of Communist repression, political elites and religious communities felt the sole urge to expand and assert the body of religious freedoms. 37 The first opposition, the Democratic Party (DP), an umbrella organization which represented different strata unhappy with the regime, promised to install 'freedom of meeting, free press, belief and its exercise'. 38 Given the lack of a proper legal framework, the relations between the state and religious communities, particularly the larger Islamic community, settled on an ad hoc and mutuallybeneficial modus vivendi for both. After its election in 1992, the DP majority proffered a number of different incentives to mobilize the support of the Muslim majority for its governing project.
The clergy and believers in general were seen as a former dissident pool almost naturally inclined to support the DP's anti-Communist agenda. That some Muslim-majority strongholds in
Central and Northern Albania, such as Shkodra and Kavaja, suffered particular deprivation during the Communist regime, strengthened the DP's political grip on these parts of the country. 41 Core DP leaders capitalized on the existing religious and regional frustrations, but pursued preferential links with the Muslim community, probably because of its sheer size. To start with, soon after the 1992 elections, the DP majority nominated an AMC representative to chair the State Secretariat (SS), the only state institution in charge of administering religious affairs. Handing the SS's chairmanship to the AMC signalled a certain preference for the Islamic majority, and gave the organization an actual institutional role to shape state policies concerning religion. The vague organization and competences of the SS, moreover, allowed the chair to intermingle 'religious interests' with 'state functions', and 'exceed its competences. 42 In parallel, important DP politicians, including the chair of the then security services, Bashkim Gazidede, piloted the creation of Kultura Islame (KI), a semi-formal organization which maintained links between party structures, Sunni hierarchy and foreign charities willing to finance the revival of Islam. 43 The DP leading authorities also made no secret of their intention to use the brand of Islamicmajority in order to garner much-needed economic and political capital from the wider Muslim world. The DP chair and then newly-elected president, Sali Berisha, forwarded a letter to then Prime Minister Alexander Mexi, advising him that the country's inherited poverty could only be eradicated through foreign aid, including aid from Islamic countries. 44 Since aid from Western countries failed to arrive, the government focused on attracting potential donors from the Islamic thinking, renew attempts to strengthen faith and discover religious morality'. 46 It was during this period of legal vacuum that the AMC proliferated its connections with foreign organizations, rebuilt its basic infrastructure, established an entire system of education, proliferated its publications, and jump-started a range of social and humanitarian activities mixed with proselytization activities. 47 The recovery of the AMC's activities, at least initially, was almost entirely dependent on foreign networks and funds willing to finance the revival of Islam. Owing to its formal and informal ties with government authorities, the AMC had carte blanche to develop its links, reorganize its structure and cultivate new activities at will.
The lack of mechanisms for registration, screening, and surveillance of the surging religious activities, when coupled with government's underground links with Muslim networks, opened the country to all kinds of Islamic missionaries, ideas and agendas. Competition for 'the hearts and minds' of post-atheist Albanian souls was especially fierce given country's closeness to European borders. To paraphrase an observation of that period, 'when the Communist law was swept aside, but no new legal framework was put in place, Albania was invaded once again: by business prospectors, "advisors", observers and religious groups who came to recruit for their faiths'. 48 At the time, Arab foundations had arguably projected a three-stage plan of Islamization:
1) initial financial assistance would lead to 2) the promotion of 'pure' Islamic values, which would then lead to 3) the installation of an Albanian Islamic state. 49 In tune with this plan, the lion's share of Arab organizations' assistance focused on converting Albanians to 'pure' Islamic behaviours. 50 The creation of a new ulama instructed in leading centers of Islamic theology that could help to 'coach' lay believers was at the very core of the project. Hundreds of Albanians were given scholarships to study theology abroad. Quran courses proliferated, and diverse Islamic periodicals and translations became available for free. 51 One of the Arab foundations alone distributed 3 million copies of the Quran, more than the total size of country's population, in the period between 1992 and 1994. The governing authorities also initiated the formalization of a proper regulatory framework regarding the rights and restrictions of religious communities, and their relationship to the state.
The 1998 Constitution elaborated in particular detail the terms for the separation, control of, and collaboration between the state and religious organizations. 55 At the base of the new framework were the principles of religious freedom, state neutrality and mutual collaboration between the state and churches towards a 'common good'. Accordingly, the state has no official religion, but respects the equality of all religious communities; the two enjoy 'mutual independence' but are still required to 'work together for the good of each and all.' 56 The state, moreover, is attributed a key role in defining and protecting the 'good of each and all', when safeguarding that religious Not all newborn Muslim groups that thrive in the autonomous spaces of civil society agree with the dimensions of the Albanian version of laïcité, the traditional templates, or the collaboration between the AMC and the state. Decentralized groups of believers avail of alternative channels in order to learn and discover their religion. Lay believers have Internet access, read international publications, study abroad, make pilgrimages, attend conferences, follow online sermons and fatwas, and organize informal meetings. 79 In this open and competitive market of ideas, Islamic religiosities are typically more personal, less institutionalized, and detached from the traditional historical prescriptions as much as the organized religious hierarchy. As Endresen puts it, 'the general situation is one of conflict over sacred authority, fragmentation of interpretations, and new, emerging forms of religiosity.' 80 At least some of these groups believe that 'Muslim behavior must always be governed by knowledge and rules based on sacred scripture, not on culture and tradition'.
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The all-powerful alliance between intellectuals oriented towards European models, governing elites committed to the project of EU integration, and a politically-engaged Muslim hierarchy, however, overrate alternative preferences or solutions that might thrive at the core of Islamic civil society. Post-Communist citizens, including a critical mass of lay Muslims, on the other hand, seem keen to protect their democratic rights and rally around familiar traditional templates.
Survey data show that most post-Communist Albanians opt for individualized 'pick and choose' modes of religious practice -only 5% attend religious services weekly; 50% attend religious ceremonies only during poignant moments in life such as birth, marriage and death; and the majority supports institutional arrangements that confine religion strictly within the private realm -away from schools, public spaces and state institutions in general. 82 Indeed, the alliance between mainstream intellectuals, governing elites, religious hierarchies and secularized citizens hold the reigns of the direction of Islam along the inherited templates of the past and their recasting according to socio-political priorities of the present.
Conclusions
This article analyzed the institutional regulations to managing Islam in post-Communist Albania.
The empirical examination focused on the range of institutional devices that mark Albanianspecific interpretations of laïcité, how they built upon past solutions, but also how they changed and developed across the socio-political contingencies of time and place.
The analysis demonstrates that the state's initial laissez faire approach towards religion ushered in a period of soul-searching for appropriate models to regulate the booming Islamic activities and competing religious networks and agendas. The revised institutional arrangements enshrined state neutrality alongside ample religious freedom, but also a set of restrictions and tighter collaboration between the state and Muslim hierarchies for the purpose of advancing 'the common good'. The fortification of a Muslim hierarchy, which plays the role of interlocutor between the state and the community, is at the core of the Albanian version of laïcité. These devices ultimately aim at safeguarding a local reformist version of Islam, which builds on past templates and develops in line with political priorities -democracy and European integration. 
